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I WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
ability to determine freely the critical issue of the defendant's credibility."'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Tello appears to expand the ill-defined
boundaries of permissible judicial comment at the expense of the integrity
of jury verdicts, and therefore impinges upon a defendant's constitutional right
to trial by jury.
THOMAS CHRISTOPHER HAVENS
X. LABOR
A. Mass Action Liability of Local Unions
Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)' to pro-
mote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes.' The LMRA encourages
116. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text (trial judge's remarks on defendant's
testimony interfered with jury's ability to independently determine defendant's credibility).
1. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. V 1983)). The LMRA
amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1976) (settlement of labor disputes through collective bargain-
ing between employers and employees enhances industrial peace and national welfare). Prior to
the passage of the LMRA, Congress limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions.
See Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976)) (no court shall issue restraining order in case involving labor dispute except in strict con-
formity with terms of Norris-LaGuardia Act). During the course of any labor dispute, the LMRA
seeks to minimize obstructions to the flow of commerce and thereby serves to protect the national
interest. Id. § 151; see also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
HAgv. L. REv. 274, 283 (1948) (union's duty under LMRA to discuss terms of employment
discourages strikes); Note, The Rise and Fall of the Employer's Quid Pro Quo Under Section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 WHrr=R L. REV. 247, 252 (1982) (contrasting policy underly-
ing Norris-LaGuardia Act with goals of LMRA) [hereinafter cited as Rise & Fail.
While the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia Act also sought to promote collective bargaining,
the major effect of those acts was to limit federal judicial interference with labor's attempts to
organize. See 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (§ 101 restricted court's jurisdiction to issue temporary
or permanent injunctions); Id. § 102 (NLRA recognizes workers' rights to associate, organize,
and designate representatives); see also id. § 151 (workers' right to organize is necessary to pro-
vide mutual protection to parties when negotiating terms and conditions of employment). The
union movement gained momentum from 1935 until the enactment of the LMRA because the
government was reluctant to regulate the formation and development of unions during that period.
See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 285, 285
(1960-61) (contrasting legislative laissez-faire toward unions with additional restraints imposed
on management by NLRA). Congress enacted the LMRA in response to the rapid increase in
labor strikes following World War II. See Note, Labor Law - § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act - Individual Liability of Wildcat Strikers, 49 TENN. L. Ry. 179, 182 n.19 (1981)
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employers and labor unions to enter into collective bargaining agreements.
3
In a typical collective bargaining agreement, a union agrees to refrain from
unauthorized work stoppages4 in exchange for an employer's promise to sub-
mit disputes to binding arbitration.' Section 301 of the LMRA provides a means
to enforce the terms of collective bargaining agreements.6 A union's breach
(labor strikes claimed more lost work days in first two months of 1946 than during entire war).
The LMRA favors binding arbitration and grievance procedures over strikes as means of
dispute settlement. See 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1976) (tenet of United States labor policy is encourage-
ment of voluntary arbitration and mediation between employer and employees when determining
working conditions); see also Rise & Fall, supra, at 252 (LMRA is product of congressional desire
to maintain industrial peace). The enactment of the NLRA and LMRA sought to equalize the
powers of labor and management in settling disputes. See generally R. GonafN, BAsIc TEXT
ON LABOR LAW, 1-6 (1976) (general history of American labor law).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (collective bargaining agreements place mutual obligation
on employees' representative and employer to confer in good faith on all issues affecting employ-
ment conditions). The usual product of collective bargaining is a written agreement that establishes
the relationship between the employer and the union. See R. GoRMAN, supra note 2, at 540 (typical
collective bargaining agreement covers matters like wages, hours, promotions, pensions, seniori-
ty, holidays, and work assignments). The collective bargaining agreement applies not only to
workers employed at the time the agreement takes effect but also governs the terms of employ-
ment of any employee who joins the work force during the term of the agreement. Id. Most
collective bargaining agreements require its parties to arbitrate disputes privately before resorting
to judicial remedies. Id. at 541. Collective bargaining is an exchange of ideas and theories bet-
ween employers and employees in an honest attempt to come to terms. Compare Glomac Plastics,
Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 94, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1979) (statutory duty to bargain requires parties to
demonstrate serious intent to adjust differences) with Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d
485, 487 (3d Cir. 1942) (employer's determination of employee pay increases without consulting
union does not amount to collective bargaining as required by NLRA).
4. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (employees' waiver of
rights to strike facilitates flow of commerce and bolsters employer's production schedule). When
a collective bargaining agreement specifies arbitration as the manner by which parties will settle
disputes, an employer cannot refuse to arbitrate. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (employer surrenders managerial autonomy in exchange for union's
guarantee not to strike over issues expressly subject to arbitration). A collective bargaining agree-
ment calls for submission of specified grievances to arbitration regardless of the apparent merit
of the claim. Id. A union's no-strike obligation is the quidpro quo for an employer's agreement
to submit grievance disputes to arbitration. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957); see Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE
L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1975) (authors speculate whether employer actually receives benefit from
collective agreement equal to benefit received by union).
5. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (agreement by
employer to arbitrate grievance disputes is quid pro quo for union's promise not to strike). In
Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court ordered an employer to arbitrate an employee grievance in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 451. The LMRA encourages parties
to settle grievance disputes by a method agreed to within their collective bargaining agreement.
See 29 U.S.C. § 171(c) (1976) (LMRA provides full government assistance to parties in formulating
agreements that provide adequate notice of proposed changes to other party); id. § 173(d) (LMRA
favors final settlement of grievance disputes by parties through application of procedures out-
lined in collective bargaining agreement over government intervention and mediation). See generally
R. GORIMAN, supra note 2, at 543-53 (discussing court decisions interpreting legislative intent behind
LMRA).
6. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). Section 301 enables federal district courts to entertain suits brought for violations
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of a collective bargaining agreement entitles an employer to bring an action
under section 301 for damages7 or injunctive relief.8 To recover damages from
a labor union for a violation of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer
must prove union responsibility for the violation under a recognized theory
of union liability. 9 The mass action theory of union liability renders a union
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization, or between labor organizations. Id.
Any district court that possesses jurisdiction over the parties may hear the case, regardless of
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Id. The importance of § 301, however,
reaches beyond jurisdictional matters. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
451 (1957) (§ 301 authorizes federal courts to develop federal common law for enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements); see also Rise & Fall, supra note 2, at 254-61 (Lincoln Mills
decision signalled revitalization of federal courts as strong force in resolution of labor disputes).
7. See LMRA § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (any labor organization is liable for
acts of its agents). Money judgments against a union are enforceable only against the organiza-
tion as a whole. Id.; see Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247 (1962) (employer's
action for damages is permissible under § 301), overruled on other grounds, Boys Markets v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The Atkinson Court ruled that a union,
but not its members, may be liable for damages caused by a union-authorized, illegal strike.
370 U.S. at 247.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, the Supreme Court held that an employer cannot
collect damages from individual union members who engage in wildcat strikes. See 451 U.S. 401,
417 (1981) (§ 301 does not allow damage action against union members who violate no-strike
provision of collective bargaining agreement). The Reis Court emphasized that Congress only
intended § 301 to support 4n action for damages against a union. Id. at 412-13.
8. See Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970) (Norris-
LaGuardia Act does not bar injunctive relief when contract requires parties to arbitrate issue).
If an employer will suffer irreparable harm due to a union's refusal to arbitrate, a court should
issue an injunction. Id.; S. Cabot, Labor Management Relations Act Manual-A Guide to Effec-
tive Labor Relations, § 17.214], at 17-10 (1978) (employer's primary remedy for union violation
of no-strike clause is injunction).
9. See Note, Wildcat Strikes - The Need For An Enforceable Damages Remedy, 1980
UTAH L. Rav. 493, 494-96 (employer may demonstrate union responsibility for wildcat strike
through common-law agency principles or mass action theory) [hereinafter cited as Enforceable
Remedy]. The LMRA specifically recognizes that a union may be liable for the illegal actions
of its members under common-law agency principles. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (employer may
sue union for wrongful acts of union agents). The presence of actual union authorization or
ratification is not necessary to hold a union liable for the actions of its members. Id. § 185(e)
(actual authorization or ratification does not control question of whether agency exists). The
unauthorized actions of a union member acting within the scope of his employment also will
bind a union. See Enforceable Remedy, supra, at 494-95 (union is responsible for acts of agent
committed within scope of his employment regardless of whether union specifically authorized
or ratified those acts); cf. United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872,
878 (4th Cir.) (union is not liable when evidence clearly shows that scope of officer's employment
did not include authority to encourage or adopt wildcat strikes), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
See generally infra note 34 (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of common-law agency prin-
ciples in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702 United Mine Workers of America).
A second method by which an employer may establish union liability is the mass action
theory. See United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948)
(basis of mass action theory is notion that large groups of men do not act collectively without
leadership), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). The mass action
theory has gained wide acceptance by other federal courts as a method to affix union liability
when large numbers of union members act in concert. See infra note 46 (discussing cases that
have recognized mass action theory as method of imposing liability upon union for unauthorized
[Vol. 41:491
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liable for acts undertaken by union members even when the union apparently
did not direct the members' actions." In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local
1702, United Mine Workers of America, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
issue of local union liability for an illegal work stoppage under the mass action
theory.12
In Consolidation Coal, a wildcat strike resulted after the suspension of
a union member who allegedly had stolen Consolidation Coal Company (Con-
solidated Coal) property from a coal mine.' 3 Since the walkout threatened
irreparable harm to Consolidated Coal,' the United States District Court for
acts of members); infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have recognized
continued validity of mass action theory after Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel). See
generally Fishman & Brown, supra note 4, at 1027 (collective action of union members presumes
union responsibility); Note, International Union Liability for Wildcat Strikes: The Carbon Fuel
Case, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1007, 1039 (1980) (mass action theory survives Carbon Fuel at least
as factual presumption of local union liability) [hereinafter cited as International Union].
A third theory under which courts have imposed union liability is the "best efforts" theory.
See Enforceable Remedy, supra, at 495 ("best efforts" theory stems from union's no-strike pro-
mise in collective bargaining agreement). The major premise of the "best efforts," or contract
sanctity theory is that a union's no-strike guarantee includes the responsibility to employ all available
means to end a wildcat strike by union members. See Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir. 1975) (no-strike clause obligates union to use best efforts
to terminate illegal strikes), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976). The Supreme Court, however,
recently held that a union's duty to use its best efforts to end an illegal strike does not arise
from a no-strike clause. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 221-22 (1979). The Carbon
Fuel Court stated that to impose such a duty on the union effectively would rewrite the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 221; see also infra notes 30-38 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel). See generally Enforceable Remedy,
supra at 497-98 (discussing Carbon Fuel's prohibition against implying duty to end strike from
union's promise to maintain integrity of contract).
10. See United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948)
(union easily may employ subtle means to instigate illegal strike without formally calling strike),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). In the absence of the mass
action theory, a union could use secret signals to call a strike and thereby avoid liability under
agency principles. Id. at 567; see also Fishman & Brown, supra note 4, at 1026-27 (chaos would
result if unions lawfully could call strikes through secret means). The collective action of members
is a fair indicator for determining whether union involvement is present in an illegal activity.
Id. at 1027.
11. 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 487 (1983).
12. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing involvement of local union
members in wildcat strike in Consolidation Coal); infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Fourth Circuit's analysis of local union's liability under mass action theory in Consolidation
Coal).
13. 709 F.2d 883.
14. Id. An employer must meet the injunction requirements set forth in Boys Markets v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970), to be eligible for a temporary no-strike
injunction. R. GoRmiAN, supra note 2, at 610. The requirements outlined in Boys Markets include
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement that contains a mandatory arbitration pro-
cedure. Id. In addition, the strike must involve a subject covered by the arbitration procedure.
Id. at 611. The collective bargaining agreement must oblige the union to refrain from strikes
and require the employer to submit the issue to arbitration. Id. at 610. Finally, the employer
must demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm should the court deny the injunction. Id. See
generally id. at 610-15 (discussing subsequent federal cases interpreting Boys Markets).
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the Northern District of West Virginia issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) directing the members of Local 1702 to return to work.' 5 When the
miners failed.to return to the mines, the district court assessed civil contempt
fines against Local 1702 and its officers. 6 Union members then returned to
work, ending a four-day strike.' 7 Consolidation Coal subsequently sued Local
1702 to recover damages sustained by the company as a result of the illegal
work stoppage.' 8
The district court concluded that the strike was a breach of the no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement between Consolidation Coal and
Local 1702 because the dispute over the allegedly stolen property was an issue
expressly subject to mandatory arbitration.' 9 Notwithstanding the district
court's determination that all union officers and committeemen had participated
in the wildcat strike to some degree,20 the district court in Consolidation Coal
refused to hold Local 1702 liable under the mass action theory. 2' Instead, the
court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel v. United Mine
Workers of America22 for the proposition that the mass action theory no longer
existed to impose liability upon a union for an unauthorized strike.23
In Carbon Fuel, local United Mine Workers (UMW) members participated
in a series of forty-eight wildcat strikes at Carbon Fuel Company (Carbon
Fuel) mines.24 Carbon Fuel brought suit against the local, district and interna-
tional unions in federal district court for damages the company sustained dur-
ing the strikes.25 At trial, the jury found all three union organizations liable
for damages on the basis of the district judge's instruction that liability at-
tached to each union entity if the evidence showed that each organization fail-
ed to use all reasonable means to prevent or terminate the illegal strikes. 26
On appeal from the district court, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the liability
of the local unions under the mass action theory.27 The Fourth Circuit deter-
15. 709 F.2d at 883. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs injunction
procedures. FED. R. Crv. P. 65; see United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 456 F.2d 483, 488
(3d Cir.) (history behind § 301 suggests that accommodation of LMRA with Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is proper), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); United States Steel Corp. v. Operating
Eng'rs, Local 18, 69 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,959 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (rule 65 governs hearing on
motion for labor injunction). But see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(e) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not alter any statute relating to temporary restraining orders (TRO) in actions between employers
and employees).
16. 709 F.2d at 883.
17. Id. at 883-84.
18. Id. at 883.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see supra note 9 (discussing mass action theory).
22. 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
23. 709 F.2d at 888.
24. 444 U.S. at 213.
25. Id. at 214.
26. Id.
27. 582 F.2d at 1350. In Carbon Fuel, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgments against
the local unions for seventeen of the work stoppages but affirmed local union liability for the
remaining thirty-one wildcat strikes. Id. at 1349-50.
[Vol. 41:491
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mined that the mass action theory represents a sensible and pragmatic ap-
proach to the problem of local wildcat strikes.28 After imposing mass action
liability on the local unions in Carbon Fuel, however, the Fourth Circuit refused
to hold the district and international unions liable because neither of those
unions had participated in the strikes nor had a duty to use their resources
to stop local wildcat strikes.29
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the non-liability of the district
and international unions in Carbon Fuel because neither organization par-
ticipated in the wildcat strikes. 30 In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme Court held
that an international or district union only incurs liability for a wildcat strike
if an agent of the union participates in the strike. 3' The Supreme Court's deci-
sion, however, did not address local union liability because the local unions
in Carbon Fuel did not appeal their liability to the Supreme Court. 32 Since
the issue of local union liability under the mass action theory was not before
the Supreme Court, the local unions remained liable for the wildcat strikes
after the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel.
3
Upon the company's appeal in Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's holding that the mass action theory did not sur-
vive the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel.34 The Consolidation Coal
28. Id. at 1349-50.
29. Id. at 1351.
30. 444 U.S.-at 218.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 215 n.3 (local unions in Carbon Fuel did not seek review of adverse judgments
in Supreme Court).
33. See id. at 215.
34. 709 F.2d at 884. See also infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (discussing Con-
solidation Coal court's analysis of mass action liability). In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's also reversed the district court's finding that Local 1702 was not liable under common-law
agency principles. See id. at 885-86. The Fourth Circuit considered evidence presented by Con-
solidation Coal at trial to prove the local union's authorization, support, or ratification of the
wildcat strike and determined that efforts made by union officials to end the strike were minimal
and foreseeably ineffective. Id. The court relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that a local union incurs
liability when its efforts to end an illegal strike have no reasonable chance of success. 709 F.2d at 886.
In United States Steel, union members had participated in an average of one wildcat strike
a month during 1977 and one every other month over the previous five-year period. 598 F.2d
at 365-66. During the strike at issue in United States Steel, the local union conducted two meetings
at which officers instructed the miners to return to work. Id. at 366. The Fifth Circuit ruled
that in light of the strike-prone history of the mine, these meetings were foreseeably ineffective
as a means of ending the strike and that the local union ratified the strike through its inaction.
Id. The United States Steel court stated that a union must make a credible demonstration of
union disapproval to avoid liability under the agency principle of ratification. Id.
The Consolidation Coal court considered Local 1702's attempts to end the strike less effec-
tive than the measures employed by union officials in United States Steel. 709 F.2d at 886. The
court conceded that Local 1702 did conduct one meeting to encourage the miners to return to
work. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, enunciated numerous preventive actions that the union
failed to try. Id. Union officials in Consolidation Coal did not return to work during the strike
or attempt to lead the strikers back into the mines. Id. In addition, Local 1702 did not employ
radio, TV or newspaper advertisements to encourage an end to the wildcat strike. Id. Union
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court stated that the sole issue before the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel was
whether an international union was liable for damages sustained by an employer
as a result of a wildcat strike by local union members if the international union
failed to use all reasonable means to end the strike.3" In Consolidation Coal,
the Fourth Circuit explained that its decision in Carbon Fuel had held the
local unions liable under the mass action theory but that the local unions did
not appeal their liability to the Supreme Court. 36 Since the issue of local union
liability did not reach the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel, the Consolidation
Coal court refused to construe the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel
as affecting application of the mass action theory to local unions. 7 In Con-
solidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit strongly emphasized that the Supreme
Court's Carbon Fuel decision did not prevent the continued use of the mass
action theory to attach responsibility to a local union for the unauthorized
mass activity of its members.
38
Having determined that the mass action theory had survived Carbon Fuel,
the Consolidation Coal court compared the actions of Local 1702's members
and officers with the actions of local union members in the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Carbon Fuel.39 The Consolidation Coal court accepted the district
court's factual determination that because all members of Local 1702 had par-
ticipated in the wildcat strike, the same type of mass action existed as was
present in Carbon Fuel."° The Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal court then
reiterated its Carbon Fuel statement that the mass action theory provided a
sensible and pragmatic approach to the problems associated with wildcat
strikes.41 The Fourth Circuit also stressed, as it had done in Carbon Fuel,
that mass action liability ordinarily attaches only to the local union because
the local union is usually the group whose members act in concert.4 2 Since
officials refrained from threatening the strikers with disciplinary action, even though the UMWA
constitution and Local 1702's by-laws imposed a duty on local officials to end unauthorized work
stoppages. Id. From Local 1702's inaction during the period of the illegal strike, the Consolida-
tion Coal court inferred union ratification. See id. at 885-86.
35. See id. at 884; 444 U.S. at 221. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Carbon Fuel. Id. at 215. The Court concluded from the history of the collective bargain-
ing agreements that the international and district unions specifically bargained for the removal
of a clause requiring affirmative action on their part to end wildcat strikes. Id. at 220. The Car-
bon Fuel Court then examined a clause in the parties' contract that obligated UMWA and District
17 to maintain the integrity of the contract. Id. at 218. The Court concluded that the integrity
clause did not require the international or district union to halt wildcat strikes. Id. at 221.
36. 709 F.2d at 884.
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Carbon Fuelv. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1978) (local unions
are liable when evidence overwhelmingly shows mass participation of union members in wildcat
strikes); Comment, Unauthorized Work Stoppages, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 805, 810 (1979) (uncon-
tradicted evidence that entire union membership engaged in strikes supports application of mass
action theory) [hereinafter cited as Work Stoppages].
40. 709 F.2d at 885. In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit explicitly relied on its deci-
sion in Carbon Fuel as support for the continued viability of the mass action theory. Id.
41. Id.; see also Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d at 1349-50.
42. 709 F.2d at 885; see also Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d at 1349. Local unions are most likely
[Vol. 41:491
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the uncontradicted evidence showed mass participation in the wildcat strike
by member and officers of Local 1702, the Consolidation Coal court held
Local 1702 liable on the basis of the mass action theory and remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of damages."3
In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the
mass action theory of local union liability survives Carbon Fuel" Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel, the Fourth Circuit had recognized
the mass action theory.," The majority of federal courts also had accepted
the mass action theory, especially as applied to local unions.16 Since the issue
to encounter mass action liability. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363,
365 (5th Cir. 1979) (only local union is liable under mass action theory unless evidence shows
complicity on part of district or international union); United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 534
F.2d 1063, 1074 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974) (local union is responsible for wildcat strike
by 2700 members as long as union was functioning as entity at time of strike).
43. 709 F.2d at 856; see also supra note 34 (Consolidation Coal court also held Local 1702
liable on common-law agency principles).
44. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolida-
tion Coal is consistent with Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel); supra notes 50-67 and
accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolidation Coal is consistent with decisions
of other federal courts addressing mass action theory).
45. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWVA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1978) (proper ap-
plication of mass action theory represents sensible and pragmatic approach to wildcat strikes);
aff'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking
Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877 (4th Cir. 1955) (local union held liable for informal strike that local
union unquestionably had approved); see also supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing decisions of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel); International Union, supra,
note 9, at 1038 (discussing practical effects of Carbon Fuel decision); Work Stoppages, supra
note 39, at 810 (Fourth Circuit was correct in holding local unions liable in Carbon Fuel under
mass action theory).
46. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, Division of Koehring Co., 616
F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1980) (union is not liable for failure to end illegal strikes in absence
of specific language requiring union to end strike), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981) and Southern
Ohio Coal Co. v. UMWA, 551 F.2d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1977) (union is not responsible for mass
action of members), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1978) with Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582
F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1978) (mass action theory represents sensible and pragmatic ap-
proach to wildcat strike), aff'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) and Turnkey Constructors
v. Cement Masons Local 685, 580 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1978) (union is liable when officer
arranged meeting with management during strike); see also Eazor Express, Inc. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir. 1975) (court realistically must regard mass action
of individual union members as union action), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Wagner Electric
Corp. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974) (local
union is responsible for wildcat strike by 2700 members as long as union functioned as entity
at time of strike); Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72,
77 (D. Utah 1980) (same); Adley Express v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 365 F. Supp.
769, 778 & n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (union is liable for mass action of members unless collective
bargaining agreement stipulates that union will not be responsible for unauthorized activities);
United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948) (mass action
theory is based on premise that large numbers of men do not act collectively without leadership),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court that expressly has rejected the mass action theory
for local union liability. See North American Coal Corp. v. Local 2262 UMWA, 497 F.2d 459,
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of local union liability did not reach the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel, the
Consolidation Coal court was correct to conclude that the Supreme Court's
decision in Carbon Fuel has no effect on the continued validity of the mass
action theory at the local union level. 47 The Fourth Circuit's determination
that Local 1702 was responsible for the mass action of its members therefore
is not inconsistent with Carbon Fuel.
48
The Consolidation Coal decision also is consistent with the decisions of
other federal courts that have addressed the mass action theory after Carbon
Fuel.49 IN North River Energy Corp. v. UMWA, District 20,5° the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether a local union was liable for a wildcat strike in which
all local union members participated. 1 Although the North River court did
not refer to the Carbon Fuel decision, the court nonetheless considered the
mass action theory as a proper means of affixing local union liability.5 2 After
466-67 (6th Cir. 1974) (union is only responsible for authorized actions of union officers and
agents). But cf. Riverton Coal Co. v. UMWA, 453 F.2d 1035, 1042 (6th Cir.) (situation may
occur when union's studied ambivalence in face of unauthorized strike would constitute suffi-
cient condonation to expose union to damages), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 915 (1972). The Sixth
Circuit's refusal to accept the mass action theory per se apparently does not preclude the possibility
that mass action by union members may impose a duty upon union leadership to end the strike.
See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMWA, 551 F.2d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1977) (liability may result
if union allows wildcat strike to continue for purpose of bringing economic pressure upon employer),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1978); see also infra note 78 (discussing similarity between common-
law agency analysis and mass action analysis).
47. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 215 n.3 (1979) (issue of mass action
liability of local unions was not before the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel). The widespread
acceptance of the mass action theory before Carbon Fuel strongly supports the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Consolidation Coal. See supra note 46 (discussing acceptance of mass action theory
by all but one of circuits that have addressed theory's validity); infra notes 50-67 and accompany-
ing text (discussing continued recognition of mass action theory by federal courts after Supreme
Court's decision in Carbon Fuel); see also Enforceable Remedy, supra note 9, at 498 (local unions
still may incur liability under mass action theory after Carbon Fuel).
48. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing support for mass action theory
and inapplicability of Supreme Court's Carbon Fuel decision to local unions).
49. See infra notes 50-73 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have addressed mass
action theory in light of Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel).
50. 664 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 1189. In North River, a wildcat strike erupted in response to a new company
(North River) policy permitting bodily searches of miners in an effort to combat theft of com-
pany property. Id. at 1187. The local president directed the miners to return to work. Id. The
president then informed the North River mine superintendent that the strikers would return to
work when North River abolished the search policy. Id. North River responded by filing a com-
plaint for injunctive relief and damages under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. Despite the issuance of
the TRO by the district court, local union officers and committeemen refused to return to work. Id.
52. Id. at 1193-94. In North River, the court reviewed the history and rationale for the
mass action theory as applied to local unions. Id. The North River court noted that a union
is only liable under the mass action theory when a correlation exists between the actions and
speech of union officers and the resulting mass conduct of union members. 664 F.2d at 1194.
Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D. Utah 1980)
(mass action theory inapplicable when violent threats by members demonstrate that union of-
ficers no longer controlled membership) with Turnkey Constructors, Inc. v. Cement Masons Local
685, 580 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1978) (union officer's arrangement of meeting between boycot-
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recognizing the validity of the mass action theory to impose union liability,
the North River court determined that the evidence was insufficient to hold
the local union liable. 3 The Eleventh Circuit refused to impose mass action
liability because the facts in North River disclosed that the local union did
not operate as a functioning entity at the time of the wildcat strike." The
Eleventh Circuit's implicit assumption in North River that Carbon Fuel did
not affect the legitimacy of the mass action theory, however, does support
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolidation Coal."
In Keebler v. Bakery Workers Union, 6 the district court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania expressly refused to interpret the Carbon Fuel deci-
sion as a repudiation of local union liability for the unauthorized mass action
of its members." In Keebler, the company sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin a wildcat strike by members of the local union. 8 The Keebler court
rejected the union's argument that the Carbon Fuel decision had vitiated the
mass action theory of union liability. 9 The Keebler court concluded that the
Carbon Fuel decision does not prevent an application of the mass action theory
to local unions.60 Since the work stoppage involved every union member
employed at the Keebler plant, the court held the union responsible for the
mass action of its members and issued a preliminary injunction.6' The Keebler
ting union members and company representative supports conclusion that local union directed
boycott).
53. 664 F.2d at 1194. The North River court found little evidence that the local union func-
tioned as a union entity during the wildcat strike. Id. The Eleventh Circuit refused to affix liabili-
ty to the local because the evidence also suggested that the wildcatters may have acted independently.
Id.; see also Eazor Express Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 960 (3d Cir.
1975) (district union membership functions as union entity when members of one local honor
picket line established by second local); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446,
455 (5th Cir. 1970) (refusal of union members at adjacent plant to work during strike by members
of different plant constitutes proof that union operated as entity), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
54. 664 F.2d at 1194. In North River, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the local union
did not function as an entity at the time of the wildcat strike because the union had lost control
over the actions of union members. Id.; see Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union, UM-
WA, 500 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D. Utah 1980) (mass action theory does not apply if union leadership
clearly has lost control over union members).
55. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuit's analysis
in North River Energy Corp. v. UMWA, District 20).
56. 104 L.R.R.M. 2625 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
57. Id. at 2627-28. The Keebler court stated that the Carbon Fuel decision involved ap-
plication of a reasonable efforts standard to measure international and district union liability.
Id. The Keebler court concluded that Carbon Fuel did not apply either to the mass action theory
or liability of a local union for wildcat strikes. Id.
58. Id. at 2625. In Keebler, the Keebler cookie company sought injunctive relief under §
301 of the LMRA for the union's alleged breach of the no-strike provision of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id.
59. Id. at 2627-28. In Keebler, the court stated that the Supreme Court clearly did not
address the mass action theory of liability in Carbon Fuel. Id. at 2628; see also Carbon Fuel
Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 215 n.3 (1979) (Supreme Court did not review judgments rendered
against local unions on basis of mass action theory in Carbon Fuel).
60. 104 L.R.R.M. at 2628.
61. Id. In Keebler, the district court concluded that most local union members engaged
in the work stoppage. Id.
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decision therefore is entirely consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Consolidation Coal.
62
In Dresser Industries v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 4601,63
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York also
considered whether a local union encountered liability under the mass action
theory for work stoppages that violate a no-strike clause in a union's collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 6" The Dresser court concluded that collective action
by the vast majority of union members creates a presumption that a local
union directed illegal actions. 61 Since less than one-half of local union members
participated in the illegal walkout in Dresser, however, the court refused to
impose mass action liability." The Dresser court's willingness to analyze union
liability under the mass action theory nonetheless reinforces the Consolida-
tion Coal court's position that the mass action theory survives the Carbon
Fuel decision.
67
The sole federal court to conclude that Carbon Fuel had repudiated the
mass action theory was the district court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania in Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters
Local 800.68 In Lakeshore, all the members of Local 800 participated in a
wildcat strike in retaliation for the employer's (Lakeshore) refusal to settle
a fuel surcharge dispute. 6' The president of Local 800 threatened the wildcat
strikers with disciplinary sanctions and termination if the strikers did not return
to work. 70 Union members ignored the local president's orders to end the
62. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing Keebler court's conclusion
that mass action theory of liability still exists).
63. 110 L.R.R.M. 2661 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
64. Id. at 2664 n.5.
65. Id. In Dresser, the court denied the company's request for an injunction because the
company failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. Id. at 2664. If the compaly
has shown that the majority of union members participated in the work stoppage, the court would
have issued the injunction. Id. See generally supra note 14 (discussing criteria for obtaining in-
junction as outlined by Supreme Court in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770).
66. 110 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
67. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (comparing Dresser decision with Fourth
Circuit's holding in Consolidation Coal). The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama also faced the issue of local union liability under the mass action theory in Encino
Shirt Co. v. International Ladies Garment Worker's Local 577, 108 L.R.R.M. 2543 (N.D. Ala.
1980). In Encino Shirt, approximately one-half of the employees of Encino Shirt Company (En-
cino Shirt) walked off the job in breach of their collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 2546.
Encino Shirt sued Local 577 to recover damages caused by the illegal walkout. Id. at 2544. Although
only two-thirds of the employees at the plant belonged to Local 577, the Encino Shirt court deter-
mined that nearly all of the employees who engaged in the walkout were union members. Id.
at 2548. From the presence of such large-scale involvement by union members, the Encino Shirt
court concluded that mass action by Local 577 was present. Id. The Encino Shirt court simply
assumed the continued validity of the mass action theory without making reference to the Supreme
Court's decision in Carbon Fuel. Id.
68. 483 F. Supp. 1150 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
69. Id. at 1151.
70. Id. at 1152. In Lakeshore, the local president instructed the wildcatters to return to
work and warned the strikers that their continued defiance would result in expulsion from the
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strike.7 Lakeshore subsequently brought an action against Local 800 to recover
damages that Lakeshore incurred during the course of the wildcat strike."
The Lakeshore court held that Carbon Fuel had diffused the mass action theory,
and the court therefore refused to impose mass action liability.
73
The Lakeshore decision does not detract from the soundness of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Consolidation Coal.74 The Lakeshore court's interpreta-
tion of Carbon Fuel is overexpansive because the Supreme Court did not con-
sider local union liability under the mass action theory in Carbon Fuel.75 Since
the issue of local union liability was not before the Supreme Court in Carbon
Fuel,76 the Lakeshore court erred in concluding that Carbon Fuel invalidated
the mass action theory at all levels of union hierarchy.7 7 Several circuit and
district court decisions both before and after Carbon Fuel also strongly sup-
port the Consolidation Coal court's continued recognition of mass action lia-
bility of local unions.
7 8
union. Id. The local union president immediately appealed to his superiors at the district level
for assistance in quelling the strike. Id. In addition, the president told Lakeshore's management
to fire all the employees participating in the wildcat strike. Id. at 1153. The union president also
informed all the strikers by letter that he was filing charges against the strikers for violation
of their collective bargaining agreement. Id. The strikers returned to work approximately two
weeks later. Id. at 1152.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1153 n. 1. The Lakeshore court did examine Local 800's potential liability under
common-law agency principles. Id. at 1152-53. The Lakeshore court cited Carbon Fuel for the
proposition that a union must condone, instigate, encourage or ratify an illegal strike before
liability attaches to the union. Id. at 1152. Emphasizing the extraordinary efforts made by the
president of Local 800 to return union members to their jobs, the Lakeshore court absolved Local
800 of responsibility for the strike. Id. at 1153; see supra note 70 (detailing union president's
efforts to terminate work stoppage in Lakeshore).
74. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that mass action theory
survives Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel).
75. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 215 n.3 (1979) (local unions did not
seek review of adverse judgments in Supreme Court); International Union, supra note 9, at 1039
n.192 (Lakeshore decision is overbroad).
76. 444 U.S. at 215 n.3.
77. See supra note 42 (discussing cases holding local unions liable under mass action theory).
78. See id. supra notes 50-67 (discussing cases recognizing continued validity of mass action
theory at local union level after Carbon Fuel). The mass action theory continues to exist as a
presumption of union involvement when large groups of union members engage in formally
unauthorized, illegal activity. See International Union, supra note 9, at 1039 (mass action theory's
factual presumption of union responsibility continues to exist after Carbon Fuel). To overcome
the presumption of involvement and escape liability, a union simply must demonstrate non-
involvement. Id. Indeed, the mass action theory only gains meaning when the court examines
the union's efforts to end illegal activity. See United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 534 F.2d
1063, 1074 (3d Cir. 1976) (mass action of union members combined with minimal union efforts
to halt wildcat strikes may result in union liability for strikes).
The evidence relevant to mass action liability thus overlaps with evidence that will determine
whether a union has ratified an illegal strike due to its failure to take measures to end the strike.
See Work Stoppages, supra note 39, at 809-10 (collective action of individual union members
presents solid basis for liability). Although the mass action theory and common-law agency theory
comprise separate bases of liability, the underlying legal theory is identical. See Consolidation
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Considering the obstacles that an employer must overcome when attempt-
ing to demonstrate union approval of a wildcat strike under agency principles,
retention of the mass action theory for imposing liability for illegal work stop-
pages at the local union level provides a necessary safeguard for employers.
7 9
In a collective bargaining agreement, an employer surrenders managerial
autonomy over his business in exchange for the union's guarantee not to
strike."0 Union members' disregard for their no-strike promise entitles an
employer to compensation for damages caused by the strike."' A local union
easily may call a strike by use of covert means so that an employer would
have great difficulty proving that the union has authorized the illegal strike. "
The mass action theory justifiably facilitates an employer's recovery by placing
the burden of disproving union involvement upon the union when union
members have acted en masse in wildcat activity. 3 Continued availability of
the mass action theory is especially important in view of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to allow damage actions against individual wildcat strikers. 4
Coal Co. v. International Union, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72, 75-76 (D. Utah 1980) (threats of
bodily harm made by wildcat strikers to union officers relieve local union of duty to discourage
wildcat strikes). In Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union UMWA, the United States
District Court for the District of Utah stated that union activity through officer action or inac-
tion must be present before liability attaches under either mass action or common-law agency
principles. Id. at 75. The court also considered mass action by union members an evidentiary
base toward finding the presence of officer action. Id.; see International Union, supra note 9,
at 1039 (mass action theory is essentially evidentiary rule with basis in objective reasoning).
The failure of union leaders to implement measures to discourage illegal strikes is an adop-
tion of the strike. See United States v. International Union, UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 567 (D.D.C.
1948) (union can avoid liability under mass action theory by taking actions that demonstrates
non-responsibility), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). The theory
underlying the common-law principle of ratification is also that union inaction in the face of
an illegal strike constitutes adoption of the strike. See supra note 9 (discussing union ratification
of illegal strikes); cf. Penn Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 195, 85 L.R.R.M. 2022, 2024
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (court refused to impose liability when union convinced members to return to
work by paying salaries of two discharged stewards pending arbitration), aff'd, 497 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1974). The use of mass action as evidence of union involvement and responsibility therefore
is necessarily part of any inquiry into union liability under the common-law agency theory. See
Fishman & Brown, supra note 4, at 1027 (mass action theory effectively views wildcat strikers
as agents of union); International Union, supra note 9, at 1039 (primary usefulness of mass action
theory is as evidentiary presumption).
79. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing employer's uncertainty that
union members will honor no-strike commitment). But see Enforceable Remedy, supra note 9,
at 498 (recovery from local union does not assist mine operator greatly because most local unions
do not have assets sufficient to pay damages incurred). District or international unions usually
are the only organizations with enough money to fully compensate an employer. Id. at 499.
80. See supra notes 4-8 (discussing employer's promise to submit grievances to arbitration
and remedies available should union violate no-strike promise).
81. See supra note 7 (discussing employer's action for damages under § 301 of LMRA).
82. See supra note 10 (union may employ subtle means to instigate illegal strike); see also
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 423 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (only
foolish union would invite liability by specifically endorsing strike).
83. See supra note 78 (discussing primary importance of mass action theory as presumption
of union involvement in illegal activity).
84. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417 (1981) (individual union
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In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702 UMWA, the members of Local
1702 engaged in a strike over an issue expressly subject to arbitration. 5 All
officers and committeemen of Local 1702 also participated in the wildcat
strike.8 6 The Consolidation Coal court's conclusion that Local 1702 was liable
for damages resulting from the mass action of its members is consistent with
the decisions of other circuits. 7 In addition, the Fourth Circuit correctly held
that Carbon Fuel did not abrogate the mass action theory at the local union
level.8" The mass action theory will help employers to secure a remedy against
local wildcat strikes when a remedy otherwise might be unobtainable. 9 The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolidation Coal will serve to protect an
employer's no-strike assurance under a collective bargaining agreement and
encourage labor organizations to maintain stricter control over the actions
of union members.
RONALD THOMAS BEVANS, JR.
B. Scope of Appellate Review of NLRB Determination of Employee
Supervisory Status
Under section 158(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act")
an employer's firing of an employee for participation in union-related activity
constitutes an unfair labor practice.' An employee who believes that his
employer fired him on account of the employee's union activity may petition
members are not liable for damages under § 301 LMRA for breach of collective bargaining agree-
ment). But see Enforceable Remedy, supra note 9, at 503-04 (Reis decision deprives employers
of excellent enforcement mechanism); see also Note, An Employer's Recourse to Wildcat Strikes
Includes Fashioning His Own Remedy: Section 301 Does Not Sanction an Individual Damage
Suit, 57 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 598, 610-11 (1981-82) (only way that employer will receive quid pro
quo for his grievance concession is by inserting explicit recovery clause in collective bargaining
agreement).
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (suspension of employee was expressly sub-
ject to arbitration under parties' collective bargaining agreement).
86. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (district court determined that union officials
participated in wildcat strike).
87. See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text (comparing Fourth Circuit's application
of mass action theory in Consolidation Coal with decisions of other circuit and district courts).
88. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis of
effect of Carbon Fuel on mass action theory).
89. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing importance of mass action
theory's availability to employer as protection of his no-strike guarantee).
1. See National Labor Relations Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). Section 158(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act") states that an employer's interference with or restraint
of employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to employees in § 157 of the Act by firing
an employee who exercises his § 157 rights constitutes an unfair labor practice. Id.; see § 157(a).
Section 157(a) of the Act guarantees employees the right to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
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the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to order reinstatement
of the employee.2 Before the Board can reach the merits of the employee's
unfair labor practice claim, however, the Board first must determine whether
the employee is a "supervisor" under section 2(11) of the Act.3 The NLRB
tions, to bargain collectively through their chosen representatives and to engage in other activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining. Id.
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). Section 160(a) of the Act empowers the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to prevent any person from engaging in an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of § 158 of the Act. Id. § 160(a); see id. § 158(a); see also supra note
1 (discussing § 158). When an employee charges an employer with an unfair labor practice, the
Board may issue and serve upon the employer a complaint stating the details of the unfair labor
practice claim and containing a notice of hearing before the Board, or member, or agent of the
Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). The accused employer has the right to file an answer
to the complaint and appear in person at the hearing to offer testimony. Id. At the Board's
direction, any other person may intervene in the proceedings and present testimony. Id. The Board
conducts the hearing in accordance with both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure.
Id. If the Board finds that the preponderance of evidence indicates that the employer named
in the complaint has committed or is committing an unfair labor practice, the Board will issue
and serve upon the employer an order to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice and/or
take affirmative action, such as reinstatement of the employee with or without back pay. See
id. § 160(c). The Board also may require the employer to make periodic reports showing the
extent to which the employer has complied with the order. Id. On the other hand, if the Board
finds that the preponderance of evidence indicates that the employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice, the Board will dismiss the complaint. Id. The term "order" is rather misleading
because Board orders do not have the force of law. See A. Cox, D. Boc & R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAW, CASEs AND MATmEaIs 109 (9th ed. 1980). If the respondent does not comply with the
Board's order, the Board must seek enforcement by filing a petition in a federal court of appeals,
generally in the circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred. See id. The Board may secure
an enforcement order even if a respondent has not refused to comply with the Board's order.
See id. Section 160(e) of the Act empowers the Board to petition the court of appeals for enforce-
ment of the Board's order, as well as for appropriate temporary relief, such as a restraining
order. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Upon the Board's filing of a petition for enforcement,
a court of appeals will serve notice of the filing upon the respondent and thereafter the court
will have jurisdiction over the proceedings. See id. Similarly, any "person aggrieved" by the
Board's order may petition a court of appeals to review the Board's order by filing with the
court a written petition requesting the court to modify or set aside the Board's order. See id.
§ 160(f); see also, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 180, 462 F.2d 1321, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 1972)
(discussion of Board procedure); F.J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969); NLRB v. Grieder Mach. Tool & Die Co., 142 F.2d
163, 165-66 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 724 (1944).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Section 2(11) of the Act defines "supervisor" as any
individual who has the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or to recommend such action effectively. Id. The Board will characterize an individual
as a supervisor under § 2(11) if the individual's exercise of any one of the enumerated indicia
of supervisory authority meets two express conditions. See id. First, the individual's exercise of
the supervisory function or functions must not be of a routine or clerical nature but must require
the use of independent judgment, and second, the individual must exercise the supervisory func-
tion or functions in the interest of the employer. See id.; see also Note, The NLRB and Super-
visory Status: An Explanation of Inconsistent Results, 94 HAgv. L. REv. 1713, 1714-18 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Supervisory Status] (discussing Board's application of § 2(11) to employees).
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has jurisdiction to hear the aggrieved employee's claim only if it finds that
the employee is not a supervisor within the meaning of section 2(11).'
The Board's case-by-case determination of employee supervisory status
under section 2(11) is difficult because the line between the exercise of
supervisory and nonsupervisory control is extremely vague.' The Board
has had particular difficulty in determining whether health care profes-
sionals, such as nurses, constitute supervisors under section 2(11).6 The
determination of a nurse's supervisory status is particularly difficult because
nurses often exercise supervisory authority in connection with their treat-
ment of patients but do so in the exercise of independent professional
judgment that is not always in the interest of the employer.7 A nurse's
exercise of supervisory authority in directing subordinate employees to
provide certain care and treatment to the employer's patients is obviously
in the best interest of the employer, but is not necessarily supervision
"in the interest of the employer" in the sense that the nurse's direction
of subordinate employees serves the end of maintaining employee discipline,
productivity, and loyalty to the employer.' The Board will find that an
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) ("employee" under Act does not include "supervisor");
see also Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 815 (2d Cir. 1980) (super-
visors are not employees under Act and therefore not entitled to Act's protection).
5. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 628 (1st Cir. 1971) (determination
of employee supervisory status is difficult question of fact); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); Furr's Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 565 (10th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 890 (1967).
6. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1468 (7th Cir. 1983) (Board's application
of § 2(11) has led to extensive but fact-bound litigation); Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d
1095, 1098-99 (6th Cir. 1981) (§ 2(11) difficult to apply to health care professionals, such as
nurses); see, e.g., Sunset Nursing Homes, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1272-74 (1976) (Board found
that licensed practical nurses were not supervisors); Diversified Health Serv. Inc., 180 N.L.R.B.
461, 461-62 (1969) (Board found registered nurse was not supervisor); New Fern Restorium Co.,
175 N.L.R.B. 871, 871 (1969) (Board found that licensed practical nurse was not supervisor).
7. See Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661, F.2d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1981).
8. See S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNo. &
AD. NEws, 3946, 3951. A nurse's direction of employees that is incidental to the nurse's treat-
ment of patients is not the exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of the employer. See
id.; Beverly Enterprises, 661 F.2d at 1103. While a nurse's exercise of discretion in directing
employees to provide treatment to patients is not strictly the exercise of authority in the interest
of the employer, the exercise of professional judgment in directing employees and the employer's
interest are not always mutually exclusive. See 661 F.2d at 1103. A nurse who has the authority
to act in the interest of the employer by implementing disciplinary action and enforcing major
personnel policies and rules in addition to the power to direct employees regarding what care
to provide which patient is a supervisor under § 2(11). See id. The crucial determination is whether
the nurse's exercise of authority in the interest of the employer is merely incidental to the nurse's
power to direct employees in patient care, or is so extensive as to constitute the exercise of authority
in the interest of the employer in addition to the nurse's patient care responsibilities. See id.
at 1101-03; cf. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 695 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
touchstone of managerial status, which is analogous to supervisory status, is the individual's alliance
with management. See id. An employee who makes decisions for the purpose of implementing
the employer's policies is a manager and is not within the protection of the Act. See id. at 696.
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employee is a supervisor under section 2(11) only if the employee exercises
independent professional judgment "in the interest of the employer. ' 9
Congress recognized the distinction between the exercise of true supervisory
authority by a professional employee, such as a nurse, and the exercise
of responsibilities that, without statutory clarification, would constitute
supervision under the Act.1" Congress amended the Act in 1947, adding
section 2(12), which includes professional employees within the coverage
of the Act and section 2(11), which excludes supervisors from the Act's
coverage."1 The Board's ascertainment of a nurse's supervisory status re-
quires the Board to balance sections 2(11) and 2(12).2 Since Congress
has delegated the resolution of professional and nonprofessional super-
visory status to the Board, courts must uphold the Board's conclusions
if substantial evidence supports the Board's findings.1 3 The Fourth Circuit
9. See supra note 3 (discussing Board's application of § 2(11) to employees).
10. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing congressional recognition of distinc-
tion between professional and nonprofessional employees).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). Under § 2(12) of the Act, a "professional employee"
is an employee whose work is predominately intellectual and varied in character and requires
the exercise of discretion as well as advanced specialized education. See id.; see also supra note
4 and accompanying text (discussing § 2(11)'s exclusion of supervisors from Act's coverage).
Professional employees are "employees" under the Act and thus within the Act's coverage. See
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (term "employee" includes any employee unless otherwise specified
in the Act); supra note 1 (discussing § 157's inclusion of employees within Act's protection).
Nurses are professional employees. See Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1102-03; S. REP.
No. 766, supra note 8, at 3951. Congress fashioned § 2(11)'s supervisory exclusion to apply primarily
to industrial workers. See Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 45 FosRHA
L. REv. 805, 807-09 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Professional Employees]. Congress based § 2(1 l)'s
test of supervisory status upon the assumption that workers operate in a bureaucratic and hierar-
chical industrial setting. See id. Professionals, on the other hand, typically do not work in a
rigidly organized, bureaucratic setting. See id. In industry, the legitimacy of a decision rests upon
the decision-maker's position in the company hierarchy. See id. Unlike industrial workers, pro-
fessionals possess authority by virtue of their expertise derived from lengthy, specialized educa-
tion and not from their position in the employer's hierarchy. See id. Congress recognized that
professionals operate in an alternate system of authority and provided in § 2(12) that the Board
was to treat professionals differently from other workers. See id. A significant amount of profes-
sional work, however, involves the exercise of responsibilities that otherwise would be super-
visory under the Act. See id. at 805. Thus, a tension exists between § 2(11) and § 2(12). See
id. Congress delegated the responsibility for resolving the tension between § 2(11) and § 2(12)
to the Board. See id; see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing Board's func-
tion). In attempting to resolve the tension between the two conflicting sections, the Board has
treated the various categories of professional employees rather differently from one another. See
Professional Employees, supra, at 810. The Board seldom compares its analysis in cases govern-
ing one group of professional employees with that of others. See id. Congress explicitly approved
of the Board's record of analyzing professionals, particularly health care professionals. See infra
note 25 (discussing legislative history to 1974 health care amendments to Act).
12. See supra note 11 (discussing §§ 2(11) and 2(12) of Act).
13. See Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1098-99 (6th Cir. 1981) (application of
§ 2(11) to health care professionals belongs to usual administration routine of Board, and court's
function limited to determining whether substantial evidence on record as whole supports Board's
findings); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 487-89 (1951) (Black
and Douglas, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Board's findings of fact conclusive
if substantial evidence on record as whole supports Board's findings); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976)
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in NLRB v. St. Mary's Home 4 considered whether substantial evidence
supported the Board's findings that a nurse was not a supervisor under
section 2(11).'1
In St. Mary's Home, an employer fired a licensed practical nurse (LPN)
allegedly because of the nurse's efforts to unionize other LPN's and auxiliary
workers at the nurse's place of employment.' 6 The Board found that the LPN,
Sheila Mitchell, was not a supervisor and the the employer, St. Mary's Home
(St. Mary's), discharged Mitchell because of her union-related activities. 7
Accordingly, the Board ordered St. Mary's to reinstate Mitchell with back
pay.' 8 When St. Mary's refused to reinstate Mitchell, the NLRB petitioned
the Fourth Circuit to enforce the order and compel St. Mary's to return Mit-
chell to her job with back pay.' 9 The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's order and found, over a vigorous dissent, that contrary to the Board's
(same).The Supreme Court in Universal Camera v. Labor Board set the standard of appellate
review that circuit courts are to apply to all Board findings of fact. See 340 U.S. at 487-89.
The Universal Camera Court reviewed the Second Circuit's enforcement of an NLRB order directing
reinstatement of an industrial employee. See id. at 475-76. The Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit's grant of enforcement and remanded the case to the Second Circuit, concluding that
the Second Circuit had applied a superficial standard of review. See id. at 491-97. The Universal
Camera Court concluded that the statutory "substantial evidence" test was vague and did not
provide courts with an adequate standard by which to review Board findings. See id. at 477-78,
see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). In defining the parameters of the "substantial evidence" test,
the Universal Camera Court stated that an appellate court must examine the entire record of
the Board's findings, including any evidence contradictory to the Board's holding, but may not
displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the court justifiably
would have made a different choice had the mater been before the court initially. See 340 U.S.
at 487-88. The Universal Camera Court found that the Board is particularly equipped to deal
with the various specialized types of employment within the labor field, and therefore, the Board's
findings with respect to labor practices carry the weight of expertise that courts do not possess
and thus must respect. See id. at 488. A reviewing court may set aside a Board decision only
when the court cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting the Board's decision
is substantial when the court views the evidence in light of the record as a whole. See id.
14. 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
15. See id. at 1065-69.
16. See id. at 1064.
17. Id. at 1065.
18. See id. NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc. is actually the consolidation of two cases.
See id. at 1064-65. In the first case, the Board charged St. Mary's Home, Inc. (St. Mary's) with
an unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain with a union after the union had won a certifica-
tion election at St. Mary's. Id. at 1064. A certification election is an election in which the employees
vote whether or not to select a union as their bargaining agent. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
The Board oversees the election and certifies the results. See id. If the union wins the election,
the employer must bargain with the union. See id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) (refusal
to bargain with union is unfair labor practice). The Board found that St. Mary's violated the
Act by refusing to bargain with the union. 690 F.2d at 1064-65. The Board ordered St. Mary's
to bargain with the union. Id. at 1065. In the second case, the Board found that St. Mary's
violated the Act by engaging in coercive and improper conduct both before and after the union
election and by discriminatorily discharging a licensed practical nurse (LPN), Sheila Mitchell,
for her union-related activity. Id. at 1064-65. See supra note 1 (discussing unfair labor practices).
19. 690 F.2d at 1065. The Board petitioned the Fourth Circuit to enforce its order compell-
ing St. Mary's to reinstate Mitchell with back pay, to bargain with the union, and to grant remedial
relief from St. Mary's coercive and improper conduct. See id. at 1064-65.
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determination, Mitchell was in fact a supervisor under section 2(11) of the Act."0
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the application of factors indicating
an employee's supervisory status to a nurse requires flexibility because the
nursing field is unique in that nurses normally exercise "independent judg-
ment" in rendering patient care. 2' Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the
court must determine whether the nurse's exercise of independent professional
judgment is merely an incident of the nurse's professional services or is in
addition to her professional services.22 The St. Mary's Home court also con-
ceded that the determination of an employee's supervisory status is within
the Board's assumed expertise and that courts must accept the Board's holding
if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Board's findings.
23
The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that when a careful review of the record
renders the court unable to find substantial evidence supporting the Board's
findings, the court may decline to enforce the Board's order.24 The St. Mary's
Home court reasoned that since the Board's inconsistent application of sec-
tion 2(11) displayed a pro-labor bias on the part of the Board, courts must
scrutinize carefully the Board's findings of employee supervisory status. 25
20. Id. at 1067, 1070. The St. Mary's Home court enforced the Board's order compelling
St. Mary's to bargain with the union and granted remedial relief from St. Mary's coercive and
improper conduct. Id. at 1070.
21. See id. at 1066.
22. See id. at 1066-67.
23. See id. at 1067 (citing Universal Camera); see also supra note 13 (discussing substantial
evidence scope of review).
24. See 690 F.2d at 1067 (citing Universal Camera).
25. See id. The Fourth Circuit in St. Mary's Home complained that the inconsistent pat-
tern of Board decisions applying the supervisory definition displayed a pro-labor bias on the
part of the Board. See id. The St. Mary's Home court noted that Board decisions on record
indicated that the Board adopts the definition of "supervisor" that will provide for the widest
coverage of the Act in order to maximize both the number of unfair labor practice findings the
Board makes and the number of unions the Board certifies. See id. (citing Supervisory Status,
supra note 3, at 1713-14). But see S. REP. No. 766, supra note 8, at 3948-51. In the legislative
history accompanying the 1974 amendments to the Act, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee indicated approval of the Board's cautious application of § 2(11) to health care pro-
fessionals. See id. at 3951; see also supra note 3 (discussing § 2(11)). The purpose of the 1974
amendments to the Act was to remove a provision in § 2(2) of the Act that excluded employees
of nonprofit hospitals from the Act's coverage. See S. REP. No. 766, supra note 8, at 3948.
In discussing the applicability of § 2(11) to health care professionals, the Senate Committee com-
mented that various organizations representing health care professionals previously had urged
Congress to amend § 2(11) to exclude health care professionals from the definition of "super-
visor". Id. at 3951. The Committee concluded that the proposed amendment was unnecessary
because the Board carefully had avoided applying § 2(11) to health care professionals, including
registered nurses, whose direction of other employees in the exercise of professional judgment
is incidental to the professional's patient care responsibilities and thus not in the interest of the
employer. See id. The Committee expected the Board to continue to carefully apply § 2(11) to
health care professionals. See id.; see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980)
(citing congressional approval of pre-1974 Board rulings and Board's method of analysis in applying
§ 2(11) to professionals); Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1099, 1101-03 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing congressional approval of pre-1974 Board rulings and Board's method of analysis in ap-
plying § 2(11) to nurses, thus giving pre-1974 Board decisions great precedential value); NLRB
v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 411-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); infra notes 53-58
and accompanying text (discussing Board's findings in St. Mary's Home).
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After reviewing the record of the Board hearing, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that substantial evidence did not support the Board's determination
that Mitchell was not a supervisor.26 The St. Mary's Home court found no
dispute that on two of the five nights of the shift Mitchell worked, Mitchell
was the highest ranking employee present at St. Mary's and was in charge
of the other employees on duty at the time." The Fourth Circuit disagreed
with the Board's conclusion that while in charge, Mitchell's activities related
exclusively to patient care.28 Rather, the St. Mary's Home court found that
Mitchell's power to recommend discipline, assign employees, make assignment
changes, excuse employees, and handle emergencies involved the exercise of
supervisory authority.2 9 The Fourth Circuit found that Mitchell performed
these activities on a regular basis.3" The St. Mary's Home court's principle
reason for according Mitchell supervisory status was the Board's finding that
on the two nights per week that Mitchell was in charge of her shift, Mitchell's
duties were exactly the same as the duties of Georgia Patillo, a registered nurse
and Mitchell's immediate supervisor. 3' The Fourth Circuit found that while
the Board refused to characterize Mitchell as a supervisor; the Board did not
find that Patillo was a supervisor. 32 The St. Mary's Home court determined
that the Board's inconsistent conclusions with respect to Mitchell and Patillo's
supervisory status illustrated the Board's pro-labor bias.
33
The dissent in St. Mary's Home took issue with both the majority's fac-
tual findings and, more importantly, with the standard of review that the ma-
jority applied.34 The dissent found substantial evidence supporting the Board's
findings, but conceded that ample evidence also existed to support the
majority's conclusion that Mitchell was a supervisor. 35 The dissent noted,
26. See 690 F.2d at 1067; infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's
findings in St. Mary's Home).
27. See 690 F.2d at 1067.
28. See id. at 1068; infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's findings
in St. Mary's Home).
29. See 690 F.2d at 1067-68. In determining whether Mitchell was a supervisor, the St.
Mary's Home court found that Mitchell had the authority to recommend discipline, assignments,
shifts of assignment, handle emergencies, and excuse employees. See id. The Fourth Circuit also
found that Mitchell had the authority to "direct responsibly" the employees on the shift Mitchell
was in charge of two nights per week. See id. According to the St. Mary's Home court, Mitchell
spent 40% of her work time exercising supervisory responsibilities and that Mitchell's activities
were not merely incidental to Mitchell's professional services but "intimately involved" super-
visory responsibilities in addition to Mitchell's professional services. See id., infra notes 44-58
and accompanying text (discussing Board's findings in St. Mary's Home).
30. See supra note 29 (discussing Fourth Circuit's findings that Mitchell exercised super-
visory authority regularly); infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's findings
in St. Mary's Home).
31. See 690 F.2d at 1068; infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's
findings in St. Mary's Home).
32. See 690 F.2d at 1068; infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's
findings in St. Mary's Home).
33. See 690 F.2d at 1068; infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Board's
findings in St. Mary's Home).
34. See 690 F.2d at 1070-72 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. See id. at 1070.
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however, that the majority had disregarded a significant body of evidence sup-
porting the Board's determination.3 6 The dissent argued that the role of a court
reviewing an NLRB supervisory determination is not to weigh items of con-
flicting evidence to reach a result contrary to the Board's findings." Since
the court's sole function is to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the Board's findings, 38 the dissent contended that the majority overstepped
the court's limited function on appeal. 39 The dissent noted that the majority
was unable to cite a single case in which a court had reversed a Board finding
that a nurse was not a supervisor."' Additionally, the dissent found that courts
consistently have accepted Board findings that nurses with substantially more
authority than Mitchell were not supervisors.4
As the dissent correctly noted, the majority in St. Mary's Home could
not cite a single case in which an appellate court overturned a Board finding
that a nurse was not a supervisor under section 2(11) of the Act. 42 The St.
Mary's Home court is the first circuit court to overrule a Board determination
that a nurse is not a supervisor.43 A review of the Board's findings in St.
36. See id. at 1070-71. The St. Mary's Home dissent contended that the majority disre-
garded the fact that when unexpected situations arose that Mitchell could not handle, Mitchell
contacted her superiors for direction. Id. Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority also
ignored the fact that Mitchell gained permission from her superiors whenever she needed to replace
an absent aide, as well as the fact that Mitchell had no authority to discipline aides, but merely
reported misconduct to her superiors. Id. The dissent also noted that the majority took a state-
ment by Mitchell that she "got the heat when something went wrong on the shift" out of context,
for Mitchell went on to say that the hospital administration held her responsible for an aide's
failure to perform in a fashion compatible with patient care. See id. at 1071 n.l. Mitchell never
acknowledged any authority with respect to matters not pertaining to patient care. See id.
37. See 690 F.2d at 1071 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
St. Mary's Home dissent disagreed with the majority's insistence on consistency between the case
at hand and several Board decisions in which the Board found that nurses with authority similar
to that of Mitchell were supervisors. See id. The dissent found the apparent inconsistency in
Board determinations irrelevant because the sole issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence
supported the Board's findings in the instant case. See id.
38. See id.; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing "substantial evidence"
test).
39. See 690 F.2d at 1072 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. See id. at 1071; see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing cases
upholding Board determination that nurse was not supervisor).
41. See 690 F.2d at 1071 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 815-18 (2d Cir. 1980)); NLRB v.
St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 4049 420-22 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Doctors' Hosp.
of Modesto, Inc. 489 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1973); see also infra notes 62-85 and accompanying
text (discussing Misericordia Hospital, St. Francis Hospital, Doctors' Hospital and other relevant
cases).
42. See infra note 43 (citing cases concerning supervisory status of nurses).
43. Cf. Medical Center at Bowling Green v. NLRB, Nos. 82-1437, 82-1566, slip op. at
4 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 1983) (upholding Board determination that nurse was not supervisor); NLRB
v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 146% (7th Cir. 1983) (same); NLRB v. Clark Manor Nursing
Home Corp., 671 F.2d 657, 659 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 818 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601
F.2d 404, 422 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); NLRB v. Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 489 F.2d 772,
776 (9th Cir. 1973) (same). But see Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (6th Cir.
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Mary's Home reveals that the dissent correctly concluded that the Fourth Cir-
cuit disregarded a substantial body of evidence supporting the Board's deci-
sion that Mitchell was not a supervisor." The majority in St. Mary's Home
found that Mitchell had the authority to deal with emergencies but disregard-
ed the Board's finding that when unexpected situations arose that Mitchell
could not handle, Mitchell contacted her superiors for direction." The Fourth
Circuit also ignored the Board's finding that Mitchell had neither the authori-
ty to schedule aides nor the authority to replace aides who failed to report
to work or who left early." Rather, the Board found that Mitchell gained
permission from her superiors whenever she needed to replace an aide. 7 While
the St. Mary's Home majority found that Mitchell had the authority to recom-
mend that the hospital administration discipline as aide for misconduct, the
Board found that Mitchell merely reported employee misconduct to her
superiors."
In addition to ignoring several crucial Board findings of fact, the Fourth
Circuit mischaracterized the Board's determination regarding Mitchell's super-
visory status. 49 Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's contention, the Board did
not find that Mitchell's activities related exclusively to patient care."° The Board
1981) (remanding case to Board due to Board's improper analysis of nurses' supervisory status);
St. Anthony Hosp. Sys. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 1981) (court did not reach
§ 2(11) issue).
44. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing Board's discussion of nurse's
supervisory status in St. Mary's Home); see also supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing
St. Mary's Home dissent's criticism of majority's holding in St. Mary's Home).
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's finding that Mit-
chell had authority to handle emergencies). But see St. Mary's Infant Home, 258 N.L.R.B. 1024,
1038 (1981) (Board found Mitchell contacted superiors for advice when unexpected situations arose).
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's finding that Mit-
chell had authority to schedule and excuse aides). But see St. Mary's Infant Home, 258 N.L.R.B.
1024, 1038 (1981) (Board found Mitchell did not have authority to schedule or excuse aides).
47. See 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038.
48. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's finding that Mit-
chell had authority to recommend discipline). But see 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038. The Board noted
that Mitchell testified that when aides misbehaved, Mitchell would make no disciplinary recom-
mendations but simply would report the incident to her superiors. See id. The Board found that
the authority to report misconduct does not constitute the effective recommendation of discipline.
See id. Although summaries of hospital administration meetings disclosed that Mitchell's superiors
instructed Mitchell to recommend discipline, the Board found that Mitchell never made disciplinary
recommendations nor did Mitchell possess the authority to effectively recommend discipline. See id.
For an employee's authority to recommend discipline to constitute supervision under § 2(11),
the employee must have the authority to recommend discipline effectively, in the sense that the
employee's superiors implement the employee's disciplinary recommendations. See supra note
3 (discussing § 2(11) of the Act); infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing nurse's authori-
ty to recommend discipline). The Fourth Circuit also disregarded Mitchell's testimony before
the Board that Mitchell spent 95% of her time engaged in patient care duties. See 690 F.2d at
1067-68 (Fourth Circuit discussing Mitchell's supervisory status). But see 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038
(Board's discussion of Mitchell's testimony).
49. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's mischaracteriza-
tion of Board's findings in St. Mary's Home).
50. See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing Fourth Circuit's determination that
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conceded that many of Mitchell's responsibilities were supervisory in nature,
but concluded that Mitchell's exercise of supervisory authority involved the
performance of routine functions that did not require Mitchell to use indepen-
dent judgment."' The Board also found that Mitchell's supervisory respon-
sibilities were incidental to her patient care duties rather than in addition to
her patient care duties.5 2
The Fourth Circuit's most serious mischaracterization of the Board's
findings concerns Mitchell and Patillo's respective power and authority." The
Fourth Circuit's holding rests on the majority's conclusion that the Board
found that two nights per week, Mitchell exercised exactly the same powers
and performed exactly the same duties as did Patillo, yet determined incon-
sistently that only Patillo was a supervisor. 4 The Board, in fact, did not find
that Mitchell and Patillo possessed exactly the same authority." The Board
found that Mitchell and Patillo exercised the same authority only in regard
to the direction of aides in patient care.5 6 The Board found that Mitchell was
subordinate to Patillo at all times, as evidence by the fact that Mitchell reported
work infractions to Patillo and Patillo, not Mitchell, evaluated the aides.
5 7
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's holding rests on an inconsistency that does not
exist.5"
Even if the Fourth Circuit had characterized the Board's findings con-
cerning Mitchell's supervisory status accurately, serious analytical flaws exist
in the Fourth Circuit's application of section 2(11) to Mitchell's job
responsibilities. 9 First, although the St. Mary's Home court acknowledged
that nursing is a unique field, the court rejected the Board's determination
that Mitchell was not a supervisor by analogizing Mitchell's exercise of super-
visory authority to cases dealing with industrial, rather than health care
employees.6" Second, as the St. Mary's Home dissent contended, other circuit
Board found Mitchell's duties related exclusively to patient care). But see infra text accompany-
ing notes 51-52 (discussing Board's findings in St. Mary's Home).
51. See 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038-39; see also supra note 3 (discussing § 2(11) of the Act).
52. See 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038-39; see also supra note 3 (discussing § 2(11) of the Act).
53. See infra text accompanying note 54 (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding that Board's
findings concerning supervisory status of Mitchell and Patillo were inconsistent).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33 (discussing Fourth Circuit's finding concern-
ing Mitchell and Patillo's supervisory status).
55. See 258 N.L.R.B. at 1038 n.63. The Director of Nursing at St. Mary's testified before
the Board that Mitchell's authority was no different from Patillo's when Mitchell was in charge
of the shift. See id. The Board construed the Director of Nursing's testimony as limited to Patillo
and Mitchell's direction of aides in patient care. See id. The Board found that Patillo was the
supervisor of the shift even when Mitchell was on duty without Patillo and that Mitchell was
subordinate to Patillo at all times because Patillo, rather than Mitchell, evaluated the aides and
because Mitchell reported work infractions to Patillo. Id.
56. See supra note 55.
57. See id.
58. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 60-96 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in Fourth Circuit's analysis
of nurse's supervisory status).
60. See 690 F.2d at 1066-69 (citing Monongahela Power Co. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 608, 613
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courts have found that nurses with more supervisory authority than Mitchell
were not supervisors. 6'
Unlike the St. Mary's Home court, the Sixth Circuit in Beverly Enter-
prises v. NLRB62 isolated each of several nurses' supervisory powers and
analyzed each power individually. 63 The employer in Beverly Enterprises had
refused to bargain with a certified union representing several LPNs. 61 The
employer contended that the LPNs were supervisoxs and thus did not belong
in the bargaining unit.65 The Board found that the LPNs were not supervisors
and ordered the employer to bargain with the unian.66 The Sixth Circuit de-
clined to enforce the Board's order, finding that the Board improperly analyzed
the nurses' authority to assign other workers.67 The Sixth Circuit, however,
agreed with the Board that the nurses' authority to adjust employee schedules
and participate in disciplining and rewarding employees did not constitute super-
vision within the meaning of section 2(1 1).6 8 The Beverly Enterprises court
found that the nurses' authority to adjust employee schedules was supervisory
in nature but stated that in order to determine whether the authority to adjust
employee schedule constituted supervision under section 2(1 1), the crucial ques-
tion was not merely whether the LPNs possessed the power to adjust employee
schedules.69 The Sixth Circuit found that the crucial question was whether
(4th Cir. 1981) (power company foremen); American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d
893, 895-96 (7th Cir. 1981) (fast food shift managers)). But see NLRB v. Doctor's Hosp. of
Modesto, Inc., 489 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1981) (nurse). In determining that Mitchell was a
supervisor, the St. Mary's Home court relied upon the NLRB v. Doctor's Hosp. of Modesto,
Inc. court's holding only peripherally. See 690 F.2d at 1067. The Fourth Circuit stated that Mit-
chell exercised greater supervisory authority than the nurse whom the Doctor's Hospital court
found to be a supervisor. Id.; see 489 F.2d at 776; supra note 11 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing distinction between industrial and professional employees). Cases dealing with the supervisory
status of industrial employees provide a poor analogy to the supervisory authority of health care
professionals, such as nurses, because industrial employees and health care professionals work
in radically different environments. See supra note 11. Even the St. Mary's Home court recogniz-
ed that nursing is a unique form of employment. See supra text accompanying note 21; see also
supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of applying § 2(11) to nurses due
to nursing's unique character).
61. See infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with supervisory
authority of nurses); supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing St. Mary'sHome dissent's
finding that other courts have held nurses with more authority than Mitchell to be supervisors).
62. 661 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1981).
63. Compare St. Mary's Home,.690 F.2d at 1067-68 with Beverly Enterprises, 661 F.2d
at 1100-04 (comparing Fourth and Sixth Circuit's analyses of nurses' supervisory status); see in-
fra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's analysis of nurse's supervisory
status in Beverly Enterprises); infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Cir-
cuit's analysis of Mitchell's supervisory status in St. Mary's Home).
64. See 661 F.2d at 1098.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1101-04; infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing Beverly Enter-
prises court's review of Board findings).
68. See 661 F.2d at 1100-01.
69. See id. at 1100. The authority to adjust employee schedules includes the power to call
in extra help, approve overtime, approve absences, and release employees early. See id. at 1099-1100.
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the LPNs' exercise of this authority was routine or involved independent
judgment. 70 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Board that the LPNs' exercise
of authority to adjust employee schedules was merely routine.7' After dispos-
ing of the nurses' authority to adjust employee schedules, the Beverly Enter-
prises court addressed the LPNs' authority to participate in disciplining and
rewarding employees.7 The Sixth Circuit found that the LPNs had the authority
to recommend discipline. 73 The Beverly Enterprises court noted, however, that
the crucial question was not whether the nurses participated in disciplinary
action, but whether the nurses' participation in disciplinary action amounted
to the "effective recommendation" that management retain, reward, or dismiss
employees. 7' The Sixth Circuit found substantial evidence supporting the
Board's determination that the LPNs did not effectively recommend disciplinary
action because the employer did not follow the nurses' recommendations with
any regularity." The Beverly Enterprises court refused to enforce the Board's
order because the Board had not analyzed properly the LPNs' authority to
assign employees.7 6 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the Board and
Mitchell, in St. Mary's Home, possessed the authority to excuse employees, reassign employees
to replace absent employees, and to make general assignment changes, according to the Fourth
Circuit. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's findings concern-
ing Mitchell's supervisory authority). The distinction between the authority to adjust employee
schedules and the authority to assign nurses is vague, and some overlap exists between the func-
tions that fall within a nurse's authority to adjust employee schedules and the functions that
fall within a nurse's authority to assign employees. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461,
1467-68 (7th Cir. 1983) (characterizing nurses' authority to pass on employees' requests to be
excused, excuse sick aides, and schedule aides for overtime work as authority to assign nurse's
aides). The Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Res-Care found that the LPNs at issue possessed the
authority to assign nurses aides. See 705 F.2d at 1467-68; infra notes 78-85 and accompanying
text (discussing Res-Care).
70. See 661 F.2d at 1100.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1100-01.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.; see also NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983) (court
upheld Board determination that LPN did not have authority to effectively recommend discipline
because LPN's superiors seldom acted upon LPN's recommendations); Misericordia Hosp. Medical
Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 817 (2d Cir. 1980) (court upheld Board determination that nurse
did not have authority to effectively recommend discipline, finding insubstantial evidence that
nurse's superiors acted upon nurse's recommendations); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood,
601 F.2d 404, 421 (9th Cir. 1979) (court found nurses' participation in disciplinary functions
consisted of merely reporting offenses to management or exercising temporary authority delegated
from head nurses).
76. See 661 F.2d at 1101-04. The Sixth Circuit in Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB concluded
that the Board's analysis of nurses' authority to assign and direct the work of employees in-
dicated that the Board misunderstood congressional intent that the Board distinguish true super-
visory authority from the professional judgment and discretion involved in patient care. See id.
at 1107; see also supra notes 8 & 25 (discussing congressional distinction between true supervisory
authority and professional's exercise of independent judgment not in interest of employer). The
Beverly Enterprises court concluded that the Board may have found that the LPNs were not
supervisors simply because the LPNs' supervisory activities in assigning and directing subordinate
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directed the Board to determine whether the nurses' authority to assign and
direct employees required the nurses to exercise independent professional judg-
ment and, if so, whether the nurses exercised independent professional judg-
ment primarily in connection with patient care or primarily in the interest of
the employer."
The Beverly Enterprises court's analysis of the LPNs' authority to assign
employees was similar to the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the issue in NLRB
v. Res-Care, Inc.78 The employer in Res-Care had refused to bargain with
a certified union, contending that because the union represented seven LPNs
who were supervisors, the employer had no duty to bargain.79 The Board found
that the nurses were not supervisors and ordered the employer to bargain.80
After the employer refused to comply with the Board's order, the Board peti-
tioned the Seventh Circuit to compel the employer to bargain.8 The Seventh
Circuit enforced the Board's order, finding substantial evidence supporting
the Board's determination that the LPNs were not supervisors.2 The Res-
Care court found that the nurses' most significant possession of supervisory
power in the interest of the employer was the authority to assign nurse's aides.83
The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that the LPNs' exercise of the
authority to assign nurse's aides was merely routine and did not involve the
exercise of independent judgment since the assignment of nurse's aides re-
quired the LPNs to use little discretion.84 The Res-Care court found that the
LPNs' duty to decide what task to assign which aide did require the nurses
to exercise discretion but that the discretion the LPNs exercised in assigning
tasks to aides was not managerial discretion in the interest of the employer,
employees were "in conjunction with their patient care responsibilities." See 661 F.2d at 1101.
The Beverly Enterprises court stated that the LPNs were not supervisors either because the LPNs
did not exercise independent judgment in assigning employees, or because the LPNs exercised
independent judgment professionally, but not in the interest of the employer. See id.
77. See id. at 1104-05. The Beverly Enterprises court directed the Board to find that the
LPNs were supervisors only if the LPNs exercised independent professional judgment in the in-
terest of the employer. See id. at 1105.
78. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing
Beverly Enterprises court's analysis of LPNs' authority to assign employees); infra notes 83-85
and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's analysis of nurses authority to assign employees
in NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.).
79. See 705 F.2d at 1465.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1472.
83. See id. at 1467-68. The Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc. found that the LPNs'
most significant supervisory powers were the authority to assign tasks to aides, pass on nurses'
aides' requests to be excused from work, excuse sick aides, advise management if fewer aides
are needed on a shift, and schedule aides for overtime work. See id.; see also supra note 69
(discussing vague distinction between authority to adjust employee schedules and authority to
assign employees).
84. See 705 F.2d at 1468. The Res-Care court noted that if the LPNs needed to replace
an aide or schedule an aide for overtime work, the LPNs merely picked a name from a list of
aides. Id.
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but rather professional discretion in the best interests of the patients.85
In contrast to the Sixth and Seventh Circuit's discreet and careful analysis
of the supervisory status of nurses under section 2(11), the St. Mary's Home
court's analysis of Mitchell's supervisory authority was superficial." Although
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that courts should apply section 2(11) to
nurses in a flexible manner, the St. Mary's Home court merely listed Mit-
chell's various responsibilities, concluded that the aggregate of Mitchell's duties
involved the exercise of supervisory power, and noted that Mitchell performed
the supervisory tasks on a regular basis.87 In other words, the Fourth Circuit
inquired only into the supervisory nature of Mitchell's authority and the fre-
quency of Mitchell's exercise of supervisory authority.8 The St. Mary's Home
court did not take its analysis further and ask whether Mitchell's authority
to adjust employee schedules and assign nurses was routine or required in-
dependent professional judgment and, if Mitchell's authority to adjust employee
schedules and assign nurses required independent judgment, whether Mitchell
exercised independent judgment primarily in connection with patient care or
in the interest of the employer.88 Nor did the Fourth Circuit ask whether Mit-
chell's recommendations of discipline were effective in the sense that St. Mary's
followed Mitchell's recommendations with any regularity. 8
85. See id. The Res-Care court saw no difference between an LPN telling an aide what
task to do and a doctor telling a nurse what care to provide which patient. See id. The Res-Care
court found that neither a nurse's nor a doctor's patient care instructions render the nurse or
doctor a supervisor under § 2(11) of the Act. See id.; see also supra notes 3 & 25 (discussing
§ 2(11) of the Act and legislative history to 1974 health care amendments to Act respectively);
supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing Beverly Enterprises court's analysis of nurses'
authority to assign aides); Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d
Cir. 1980) (nurse's duty to assign employees incidental to nurse's primary duty to maintain welfare
of patients).
86. See supra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (discussing Beverly Enterprises and Res-
Care analysis of supervisory status of nurses). But see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text
(discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis of Mitchell's supervisory status in St. Mary's Home).
87. See St. Mary's Home, 690 F.2d at 1067-68.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. In addition to analyzing Mitchell's supervisory responsibilities in a cursory fashion,
the Fourth Circuit also found great significance in Mitchell's status as the highest ranking employee
on the premises two nights per week. See id. at 1068-69. The St. Mary's Home court cited with
approval a case involving the supervisory status of fast food shift managers, in which the Seventh
Circuit overturned a Board determination that the shift managers were not supervisors on the
ground that the shift managers were the ranking employees on the job-site when they were in
charge of their shifts. Id.; see American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 895-96
(7th Cir. 1981). Unlike the St. Mary's Home court, other courts that have considered the super-
visory status of nurses have found the fact that a nurse was the highest ranking employee on
the premises to be of little significance. See Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1467 (although LPNs were
highest ranking employees on premises, fact alone did not make LPNs supervisors); Beverly Enter-
prises, 661 F.2d at 1097 (court accorded no special significance to nurses' occasional status as
highest ranking employees on premises); Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d
808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980) (court found substantial evidence supporting Board's determination that
nurse was not supervisor, even though nurse had 24 hour responsibility for her shift); see also
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While the St. Mary's Home court acknowledged that Congress sought
to distinguish between the exercise of professional judgment that is incidental
to patient care and that which is in addition to patient care, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's superficial treatment of Mitchell's various responsibilities indicates that
the Fourth Circuit did not appreciate fully the distinction that Congress sought
to make in the health care field between true supervisory authority and the
exercise of professional judgment implicit in patient care.9 According to the
Beverly Enterprises court, the distinction is crucial, not because patient care
is merely a routine matter requiring no independent professional judgment,
but because the independent judgment necessarily involved in patient care is
not always strictly in the interest of the employer.9" Thus, a nurse's exercise
of independent judgment in directing employees alone should not confer super-
visory status upon the nurse.9" Once a court has identified a nurse's super-
visory duties, a full analysis of the nurse's supervisory status involves a two
part approach. A court must first ask whether the nurse's activities require
independent professional judgment. 94 If the nurse's activities require the exer-
cise of independent professional judgment, a court then must ask whether
the nurse exercises judgment primarily in connection with patient care not
in the interest of the employer or in the interest of the employer and not mere-
ly pursuant to patient care. 9" A nurse is a supervisor under section 2(11) only
if the nurse's supervisory duties require the nurse to exercise independent pro-
fessional judgment in the interest of the employer.
96
The Fourth Circuit prefaced its analysis of Mitchell's supervisory status
by conceding that courts must defer to the Board's expertise and uphold the
Board's result if substantial evidence supports the Board's findings. 97 Never-
theless, the Fourth Circuit's groundbreaking rejection of a Board finding that
a nurse was not a supervisor, flawed analysis, and omission and
mischaracterization of crucial Board findings indicates that the St. Mary's
Home dissent correctly concluded that the majority merely paid passing
reference to the court's limited appellate function of determining whether
substantial evidence supports the Board's findings. 98 The Fourth Circuit not
supra notes 11 & 60 (discussing inapplicability of cases dealing with supervisory status of in-
dustrial employees to determination of supervisory status of nurses).
91. See St. Mary's Home, 690 F.2d at 1066-67, 1067 n.ll (citing S. REP. No. 766, supra
note 8, at 3951); Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1101 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussing con-
gressional direction to Board to distinguish between true supervisory authority and independent
professional judgment involved in patient care); supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing
shortcomings of Fourth Circuit's analysis of Mitchell's supervisory status); see also supra notes
8, 11 & 25 (discussing legislative history to 1974 health care amendments to the Act).
92. See Beverly Enterprises, 661 F.2d at 1101.
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing Beverly Enterprises court's
review of proper analysis of nurses' supervisory status).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See 690 F.2d at 1067.
98. See supra notes 42-61 & 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings in Fourth
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